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Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law 
and Technology 
Kieran Tranter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Bruno Latour has suggested that the defining feature of 
modernity has been the creation of monsters.  While modernity 
has been erected on the division of the world into disciplines, a 
consequence of this neat structure has been the birthing of 
dilemmas—hybrids—that are not reducible to one order of 
knowledge.1  One manifestation of this observation is the 
hybridization of thought through the crossing of disciplinary 
boundaries. 
This Article presents such a hybrid, combining the 
insights of legal theory and technology studies.  It argues that 
phenomenological approaches to the study of law and 
technology offer ways of understanding the relations between 
law and technology that avoids the reduction of law to 
technology that characterizes most current scholarship.  The 
starting point is the observation that legal scholarship on 
technology articulates a theory of law and technology by 
conceiving law as a form of technical apparatus.  In this it 
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 1. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 6 (Catherine Porter 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1993). 
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invokes the nomology of sovereignty.  By nomology of 
sovereignty what is meant is the understanding of law as a 
field of knowledge about rules and the manipulation of rules 
for any purpose by the sovereign.  Exposing the nomology of 
sovereignty leads to more essential critiques of technology, as 
the technical character of the law suggests the ontological 
concern with the forgetting of Being first raised by Martin 
Heidegger.  Heidegger regarded modern technically mediated 
existence as highly negative. He located the origins of this 
negative modernity within the Western philosophic tradition.  
In response he argued the necessity for Western thought to 
return to its absolute origins in pre-Socratic Greek thinking as 
the study of ontology; that is the fundamental structure of the 
world and the relation of fundamental structure to human 
existence.  In so doing, Heidegger claimed to have removed the 
conceptual distractions and obstacles from thinking about 
essential existence, or in his preferred term Being, and thereby 
opening a way to move beyond modern technical existence.  
Heidegger’s way through what he sees as the debris of 
Western philosophy has been taken by subsequent theorists in 
several directions.  One direction remains within Heidegger’s 
metaphysics and tragically talks of absolute inescapable 
technology, the other returns to being-in the world in 
phenomenology.  It is suggested that phenomenological 
approaches, approaches that begin with an appreciation of the 
world as is and by embracing the world’s messy complexities, 
provide a rich vein for the development of law and technology 
studies. 
Section I takes up the theme of monsters.  It argues that 
the story of Frankenstein’s monster manifests twice over 
within law and technology scholarship.  In describing an 
abomination of technology and humanity, this literature 
frequently presents law as the savior.  This is ironic because 
law turns out to be a monster in disguise; it is neither good nor 
evil, but pure power, which provided it is controlled by the 
lawyer/technocratic can benefit a passive society.  Section II 
locates law and technology’s technical law within the nomology 
of sovereignty.  Through Weber, Schmitt, Benjamin, and 
Agamben, it is suggested that the violence intimate to the 
nomology of sovereignty has its origins in Heidegger’s claim 
concerning the forgetting of Being in the West.  Section III 
reexamines Heidegger’s theory on the relations of technology 
and Being and considers its theoretical and methodological 
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outcomes.  Section IV argues that phenomenology provides 
alternative methods through which to think about law and 
technology. In particular it argues that an approach to 
studying law and technology through detailed and rich 
historical examinations, or alternatively approaches focusing 
on the speculative narratives embedded in law and technology 
and utilizing science fiction to think through this speculative 
jurisdiction, provide alternative frames through which to 
further study law and technology. 
I. FRANKENSTEIN AS MODERN MYTH 
This section argues that legal writing about technology is 
ironically structured on the modern myth of Frankenstein.  
This argument begins by examining literary concern with 
Frankenstein as mythic and indeed as a modern myth.  It then 
considers how this myth manifests twice over within law and 
technology scholarship. First, as narrative characterizing 
technology as a dangerous monster needed the control and 
order of law.  Second, and ironically, the character of this 
controlling law is also monstrous. 
The formal elements of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein are 
well known; scientist creates monster, scientist spurs monster, 
monster learns about humanity and its own monstrousness, 
monster becomes pathological, climaxing with monster killing 
scientist.2  Indeed, critics referring to this familiarity have 
argued that Frankenstein is mythic rather then textual,3 
suggesting a residual dilemma that surrounds the novel.4  
Formally, myths are associated with the oral, pre-modern and 
pre-rational, and to talk about them in the context of a 
written, modern artifact like a novel is problematic: “Since 
modernity is opposed to myth, denying the relevance of myth 
to itself, there is an initial problem of how coherently to 
represent these accounts of myth in modern terms.”5  
Frankenstein, as cultural scholars have identified in their 
cataloguing of its archive,6 exceeds Shelley’s text.  Indeed, it is 
 2. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (A 
Signet Classic 1965) (1818). 
 3. See, e.g., CHRIS BALDICK, IN FRANKENSTEIN’S SHADOW: MYTH, 
MONSTROSITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY WRITING 1–9 (1987); JON TURNEY, 
FRANKENSTEIN’S FOOTSTEPS: SCIENCE, GENETICS, AND POPULAR CULTURE 4 
(1998). 
 4. TURNEY, supra note 3, at 26–28. 
 5. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 14 (1992). 
 6. STEVEN EARL FORRY, HIDEOUS PROGENIES: DRAMATIZATIONS OF 
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this excess within popular culture that allows Frankenstein to 
be regarded as a myth manifesting differently in different 
articulations while possessing a stable symbolic content.7 
Baldick also argues that Frankenstein is not just a 
modern myth but a myth of modernity.8  As numerous scholars 
have noted,9 the Frankenstein myth concerns the 
quintessential modern relationship between humans and 
technology.  It provides what amounts to a series of interlinked 
characterizations and associations concerning scientists, 
technology, and human society.  Victor Frankenstein, the 
protagonist, becomes the epitome of the rational scientist too 
preoccupied with his techniques to consider the wider context 
of his illicit creation.10  As a metaphor for technology, the 
monster is ambiguous: it has the potential for good11 (e.g., 
rescuing a child, appreciating classical literature and history 
such as Goethe, Plutarch, and Milton) and the potential for 
evil (e.g. murdering Elizabeth, Victor Frankenstein’s bride, on 
their wedding night).12  It is at once a thing to be pitied and a 
thing to be feared, and in most commentaries, Victor, with his 
ego and petty revulsion, is revealed as the true monster.13  The 
monster’s “thing-ness,” its status as external to humanity, is 
FRANKENSTEIN FROM MARY SHELLEY TO THE PRESENT (1990); DONALD F. 
GLUT, THE FRANKENSTEIN ARCHIVE: ESSAYS ON THE MONSTER, THE MYTH, 
THE MOVIES AND MORE (2002).  See generally DONALD F. GLUT, THE 
FRANKENSTEIN CATALOG (1984) (compiling a variety of works derived from 
the story of Frankenstein, including novels, translations, adaptations, series, 
stage plays, films, and musical recordings). 
 7. See WALTER ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF 
THE WORD 12 (1982) (“The elements out of which a term is originally built 
usually, and probably always, linger somehow in subsequent meanings, 
perhaps obscurely but often powerfully and even irreducibly.”). 
 8. BALDICK, supra note 3, at 5. 
 9. See BRIAN ALDISS & DAVID WINGROVE, TRILLION YEAR SPREE: THE 
HISTORY OF SCIENCE FICTION 51 (1986); THE ENDURANCE OF FRANKENSTEIN: 
ESSAYS ON MARY SHELLEY’S NOVEL 3, 16–17 (George Levine ed., 1979).  See 
generally FRED BOTTING, MAKING MONSTROUS: FRANKENSTEIN, CRITICISM, 
THEORY 164–84 (1991). 
 10. LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-
CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 313 (1977). 
 11. Robert Olorenshaw, Narrating the Monster: From Mary Shelley to 
Bram Stoker, in FRANKENSTEIN, CREATION AND MONSTROSITY 165 (Stephen 
Bann ed., 1994). 
 12. See TURNEY, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
 13. See, e.g., ANDREW MILNER, LITERATURE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 155 
(1996) (describing Frankenstein’s “bad faith” in reneging on his promise to 
build a companion for his creation). 
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repeatedly emphasized through its exclusion from human 
society and its desire for a mate of its own kind.  In this the 
monster animates an amoral and non-human 
conceptualization of technology.  Frankenstein also shows the 
vulnerability of human society to the revolutionary, and often 
bloody, product of science.  The scientist concocts in his private 
rooms, while society remains passive and impotent against the 
depravity of his monstrous creation.  Absent from the myth is 
any institutional counterforce; there is no Inquisition or Royal 
Society to control the scientist and creation. 
It is at this point that a specific legal articulation of the 
Frankenstein myth introduces a possible solution.  Much law 
and technology scholarship articulates elements of the 
Frankenstein myth.  It presents scientists as knowledge 
seekers blind to the wider contexts, and technologies as 
monsters possessing the potential for good and evil while 
society lies vulnerable.  Glenn Reynolds exemplifies this 
tendency in a recent article about nanotechnology. He notes 
that society has yet to consider the wider dimensions of this 
research14 and he canvasses its potential benefits and 
harms.15  The legal supplement to the Frankenstein myth 
emerges in Reynolds’ articulation of this social element.  
Reynolds devotes the bulk of his paper to assessing legal 
responses to nanotechnology.16  Faced with the possibility for 
good or evil from this technology, Reynolds’ has society turning 
to law for regulation.  Faced with the possibility for good or 
evil, society turns to law for regulation.17  Thus Reynolds 
follows a historical pattern of invoking law to regulate 
monsters.18  The question becomes one of selecting the right 
instruments.  For Reynolds, this involves rejecting outright 
prohibition or exceptions for military purposes and affirming a 
compound approach of guidelines and licensing.19  In the legal 
Frankenstein story, society might be vulnerable to 
technological change, but it is not passive.  Law will restrain 
the monster’s urges and harness them for the greater good; 
 14. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: 
Three Futures, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180–81 (2003). 
 15. Id. at 185–187. 
 16. See id. at 187–209. 
 17. Id. at 187. 
 18. Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the 
Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS 
OF LAW 19 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999). 
 19. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 188–209. 
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provided “the political system will approach these questions 
with wisdom, rather than arrogance.”20 
An irony intrudes at this point.  The legal articulation of 
the Frankenstein myth champions the law as a technical 
discourse.21  The assessment of law becomes a comparison of 
techniques, logically explored through analogy and evidence.  
Reynolds assesses the policy alternatives by examining the 
costs and benefits of prohibition,22 and comparing 
nanotechnology to the military restriction of nuclear 
technology23 and regulation in the biotechnology regime.24  
Arthur Cockfield has hinted that often in the context of law 
and technology “law is technology.”25  The irony lies in how the 
invocation of law to save society might reinscribe the 
Frankenstein myth, with the lawyer cast as the technician and 
law playing the role of the monster.  What is being suggested 
is that the Frankenstein myth functions within discourses on 
law and technology.  That it is not just a collection of images of 
technology out of control or of the immorality of science, but 
replicates itself within the arguments by lawyers concerning 
legal responses to technology.  Law is seen as power which can 
be used for good, or more precisely to achieve good within 
society.  However, this good is not intrinsic to law.  Like the 
monster law is beyond good and evil, a pure power, and it is 
only when subject to the will of the lawyer/technician can its 
power be harnessed for good.  The irony is in invoking law to 
save society from the possible depredations of monstrous 
technology what is unleashed is another monster, the “tame” 
monster of law. 
There are two immediate responses to this observation.  
The first is that it is theoretically interesting but superfluous 
to the pragmatics of public policy.  Intellectual sustenance for 
this approach can be found in Søren Kierkegaard, who 
considers that irony “limits, finitizes, and circumscribes” and 
in doing so actually grounds a practical and engaged living.26  
 20. Id. at 209. 
 21. See Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: 
Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2005). 
 22. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 188–92. 
 23. Id. at 193–207. 
 24. Id. at 197–200. 
 25. Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MAN. 
L.J. 382, 402 (2005). 
 26. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF IRONY WITH CONTINUAL 
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The second response is that the proposition that law is a 
fantastic technological terror is an extreme example of 
totalizing categorization obliterating questions of degree.  In 
short, if law is technology, then it is a beast that has long been 
domesticated, and like the motor vehicle, it is familiar.  This 
ignores a salient truth: just because the motor vehicle is 
familiar does not excuse it from being the eleventh worldwide 
killer in 2002.27  Similarly, the fact that techniques of law, 
(e.g. of the merits and substance of various forms of regulation, 
of the effect of criminal sanctions and prohibitions, when 
guidelines are more appropriate then statutory codes, the 
utility of administrators with wide discretionary powers as 
opposed to narrowly prescribed duties and obligations, of the 
cost and benefits of letting the courts develop law on a case to 
case basis)  are familiar does not mean that the implications of 
law as technology are not significant for thinking about a 
theory of law and technology.  Indeed, monstrous violence and 
death reappear when considering the theoretical implications 
of this recognition. 
II. NOMOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The previous section, by identifying the function of the 
Frankenstein myth, showed that the relevant scholarship 
disclosed a theory of law and technology in subsuming law to 
technology.  This section considers this within the context of 
legal theory. It is argued that in doing this, what is disclosed is 
the nomology of sovereignty, which at its most pure, or most 
extreme, threatens human life.  This conclusion is reached 
through recognition of the nomology of sovereignty behind the 
technical discussions of law and technology about how to do 
things with rules.  It considers how the nomology of 
sovereignty can be part explained, as Weber did, as the 
rationalization of the legal system.  However, in emphasizing 
rationality the essential irrationality has been under-
emphasized.  Through experience of, involvement with, and 
reflection on, the transformation of the Weimar Republic to 
Nazi Germany, writers such as Schmitt, Benjamin and 
Agamben expose the fundamental violence of sovereignty and 
its ultimate transformation of humans into animals. 
The articulation of the Frankenstein myth in law and 
REFERENCE TO SOCRATES 326 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds., 1989). 
 27. WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 4 (Margie 
Peden et al. eds., 2004). 
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technology scholarship means that legal thinking about 
technology embodies a particular nomology.  This unifies the 
ostensibly diverse strands of law and technology scholarship.  
Legal scholarship on technology concerns the effectiveness of 
rules.  The analysis proceeds by way of statements concerning 
how rules work, often drawing upon a priori thinking about 
rules mixed with case studies through which psychological, 
sociological, and economic assumptions concerning actors’ 
responses to particular forms of regulation are examined.  
Regardless of whether the authors ultimately select standards, 
licensing, self-regulation, economic incentives, criminalization, 
regulation, or the common law, there is a shared nomology of 
law that serves as a tool for public policy.  This nomology is not 
unique to law and technology, but rather, as W. T. Murphy has 
observed, it is the bedrock of modern legal thinking: 
Law today is . . . constrained to produce knowledge at secondhand: 
knowledge of the rules which govern – or fail to govern, as the case 
may be – the world as it is ‘really’ known to be – by psychologists, 
economists, accountants and others. Knowledge and power, at one 
level, are no less linked than they were before. But now the link 
must be specified in terms of the production of performance 
indicators and the diagnosis of social problems . . . .28 
However, to consider the theoretical implications of law as 
technology another story needs to be told. 
The English common law was an oral law, indeed a mythic 
law.29  Located in time immemorial, it claimed that it 
emanated from the very soil of the “Sceptred Isle.”30  The 
judicial function was to declare the law, not make it, and legal 
training amounted to memorizing speeches and decisions of 
the past.31  Written records, where they existed, were cryptic 
mnemonic aids for those initiated in their craft of “artificial 
reason.”32  Nonetheless, as with the wider Reformation, 
England experienced legal reformation in the expansion of the 
 28. W. T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Properties of 
the Common Law Tradition, 54 MOD. L. REV. 182, 213–14 (1991). 
 29. See COSTAS DOUZINA ET AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW 
OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW 153 (1991). 
 30. See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF 
MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 210–13 (1990); see also GERALD J. POSTEMA, 
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 4–5 (1986). 
 31. See generally PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE 86–90 
(1996) (discussing oral legal traditions). 
 32. Id. at 108. 
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influence of the Crown and Parliament.33 Politically, the 
common law negotiated this period by aligning with the Crown 
and nationalizing its jurisdiction as the King’s Court.34  It also 
developed the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, 
reinventing itself as a body of inferior rules.35  This preserved 
much of the common law, both in practice and doctrine, until 
the reforms of the nineteenth century.36 
Such a story is familiar.  Indeed, the narrative of the 
Reformation birthing a spirit of rational activity that 
refashions the pre-modern into the modern has its origins in 
Max Weber’s rationalization thesis, which  linked protestant 
asceticism to the formation of capitalism and also to the 
machine-culture of modern life.37  For Weber, the evolution of 
modern law was a movement from oral legal orders, to 
systemic codification, to the provision of procedural 
frameworks for rational bureaucracy.38  Weber, however, 
underplayed a critical creature that emerged during this 
development—the sovereign.  Familiarity dims awareness of 
how radical Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan was within Western 
political and legal thought.39  Hobbes declared a particular act, 
the social contract, as the origin of political and legal 
authority.40  Unlike the common law and other pre-modern 
orders where continuity was assured through transcendence, 
the emergence of the sovereign meant that questions of 
authority became temporal.41  Law was no longer law because 
of custom or nature, but rather because of a valid lawmaking 
act of the sovereign.  The modern history of jurisprudence can 
be read as an attempt to relate the sovereign’s plastic law to 
 33. W. T. MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE?: CONFIGURATIONS OF 
LAW AND MODERNITY 72–74 (1997). 
 34. See generally PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSCHOANALYSIS, 
HISTORY, LAW 70 (1995) (describing the adoption of the common law in 
medieval England). 
 35. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 102–03. 
 36. See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 
AND POLITICAL THEORY 29–34 (1982). 
 37. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
180–182 (Talcott Parsons trans. 1992). 
 38. Maureen Cain, The Limits of Idealism: Max Weber and the Sociology 
of Law, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 53, 70 (1980). 
 39. DAVID SAUNDERS, ANTI-LAWYERS: RELIGION AND THE CRITICS OF 
LAW AND STATE 4–6 (1997). 
 40. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (A.D. Lindsay & K.R. Minogue 
eds.,1914). 
 41. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 48. 
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questions of identification, obedience, and limit.42  With the 
sovereign, creation is not located in a mythic time but merges 
with lived time to be an ever present possibility.  Jacques 
Derrida termed this critical element of modernity “white 
mythology.”43  The phrase plays on ambiguities.44  First, 
“white” is used in two ways; it is a white mythology because it 
belongs to the West; and it is white because it is a colorless 
myth. In merging mythic and lived time, the color and poetry 
of the creation stories of pre-modernity are lost.  Gesturing 
towards Weber, creation becomes a bland task of the 
sovereign’s officers writing on white paper.  Second, to talk of a 
mythology of modernity is to deny modernity’s own claims to 
have dispensed with the irrational. 
It is the revelation of the irrational at the core of 
sovereignty that has been missed by much twentieth century 
legal thought.  Hans Kelsen proposed a legal order rationally 
unfolding from a shared grundnorm; that the legal order is 
legitimized by a fundamental “political” acceptance of its 
legitimacy.45  Ronald Dworkin proposed a theory of 
adjudication as a Herculean, yet rational activity.46  Indeed, 
liberal political thought has tried to deny the irrationality of 
sovereignty; having birthed Leviathan, theory has put it in the 
chains of constitutions, rights, separation of powers, and due 
process.47  It took the chaos of the Weimar Republic, and the 
perception that rational application of liberal values could not 
form a nation capable of defending itself from its internal and 
external enemies that led the Weimar jurist Carl Schmitt to 
reaffirm the irrationality of sovereignty.48  Schmitt defined the 
sovereign as the entity that could declare an exception: 
suspending or abolishing the existing order, and deciding on 
whatever measures are required to address the exception.49  
 42. COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 110–112 (2000). 
 43. JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 213 (Alan Bass trans., 
1982). 
 44. FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 32. 
 45. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 
56–57 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992). 
 46. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–123 (1977). 
 47. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 69–70 (1995). 
 48. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 32 (George Schwab 
trans. 1996). 
 49. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE 
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Schmitt was one of the first legal theorists to recognize that 
law in modernity is another technology.50  He perceived 
positive law of liberal legislatures as mere naked power 
transmuted into whatever ends are regarded as appropriate.51  
He was similarly critical of liberalism because it could not 
distinguish between values—between ends that will defend 
and sustain the nation, and ends that give the nation over to 
its enemies.  In this inability to distinguish values, modern 
law and liberalism both manifest the “economical-technical 
apparatus” which is indifferent between “a silk blouse and 
poison gas.”52 
For Schmitt, the hubris of liberalism, its inability to 
distinguish between values and ultimately between friends 
and enemies of the nation, creates the nemesis of sovereign 
authoritarianism.  However, Schmitt’s polemics of sovereigns 
and enemies was also “white.”  He is not concerned with the 
personal costs of the rationality/irrationality of sovereignty.  
Schmitt’s context as a conservative jurist who advances within 
the academy and goes on to holds official appointments within 
the Nazi government53 should remind of the violence and 
horrors of that regime. Nevertheless, it has only been recently 
that violence has been appreciated within legal theory.  The 
vehicle for this has been the reception of another Weimar 
intellectual, in correspondence with Schmitt,54 but from a 
radically different political and religious tradition—Walter 
Benjamin.  Through an extended examination of Benjamin’s 
“Critique of Violence,” Derrida has reminded jurisprudence 
that legal order is founded on two violences: the violence that 
founds and the violence that preserves the law.55  Both become 
indistinguishable in the modern apparatus of the police state.  
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans. 1985); see also CARL 
SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 69 (Jeffery Seitzer trans., 2004). 
 50. JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: 
AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY 31–82 (1997). 
 51. Carl Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929), 
96 TELOS 130 (1993). 
 52. CARL SCHMITT, THE IDEA OF REPRESENTATION: A DISCUSSION 39 
(E.M. Codd trans., 1988). 
 53. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt In 
Post-War European Thought (2003). 
 54. Samuel Weber, Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and 
Carl Schmitt, 22 DIACRITICS 5 (1992). 
 55. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundations of 
Authority”, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 35–40 
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474. 
460 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
                                                          
 
The shared commonality is a species of “mythic violence,” as 
opposed to “divine violence” and the defining characteristic is 
the need for blood:56  “Mythical violence is bloody power over 
mere life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all 
life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice, the 
second accepts it.57  It is tempting to locate Benjamin’s essay 
within his life, and consider, in his suicide on the Spanish 
border in 1940 while fleeing occupied France, that the text was 
a response to the Nazi state. However, “Critique of Violence,” 
dated 1921, anticipated rather then “witnessed” the bloody 
machinations of Nazism.58  Giorgio Agamben, drawing upon 
Schmitt and Benjamin, does attempt to construct a juridical 
account of Nazism’s signature excess: the concentration camp.  
For Agamben, the camp is not to be understood as just an evil, 
the tragic production of madmen, but rather it’s a 
manifestation of the “perfection” of the nomology of 
sovereignty in the West.59  The camp makes explicit that the 
ultimate fact of sovereignty is violent power over bare life, the 
very physical bodies of subjects.60 
So the nomology of law and technology scholarship reveals 
three elements.  The first is that law is considered 
technological, a discourse about techniques and effectiveness.  
The second is that this rational project is grounded on the 
terrible irrationality of sovereign violence.  Sovereignty 
allowed law to become historical and instrumental; it 
facilitated a changeable law that in essence is not subject to a 
meta-law.61  Indeed, it is sensible to talk of a non-nomology of 
sovereignty.62  The place where the extent of this law of a 
sovereign that knows no boundaries is registered is the human 
body.  The third is this sacrilege of the human.  In this camp, 
Agamben forcefully reminds that the human becomes just an 
 56. Id. at 42–45, 52. 
 57. WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, 
APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277, 297 (Edmund Jephcott 
trans., 1978). 
 58. Derrida, supra note 55, at 57. 
 59. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 
166–174 (1998). 
 60. Id. at 175. 
 61. William P. MacNeil, One Recht to Rule Them All! Law’s Empire in the 
Age of Empire, in AESTHETICS IN LAW AND CULTURE: TEXT, IMAGES, SCREENS 
279 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Peter D. Rush eds., 2004). 
 62. Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667, 679–680 
(1990). 
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animal: a material substance to be used and consumed.63  A 
symptom of this is rights discourse where the subject before 
the law is atomized into a collective of abstract postulates that 
do not relate to, nor preserve, biological life.64  Absent from 
this tripartite of nomology, sovereignty, and animal is a 
perception of what it might mean to be an entity that can 
appreciate itself as an entity, and can appreciate itself thrown 
into a world possessing this temporal structure.  This suggests 
the third Weimar intellectual invoked by Derrida—Heidegger 
and his concern with a return to ontology as the task of 
philosophy.65 
III. ONTOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY 
This section approaches law and technology from 
technological theory: specifically through remembering 
Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology. Heidegger is 
significant because, unlike legal theory where attempts to 
secure humanity from nomology-sovereignty-animal often end 
in rhetorical calls that knowing the “machine” of West will 
lead to its interruption,66 or with variations on Benjamin’s 
divine violence,67 technology studies drawn from Heidegger 
demonstrate ways of living with technology. 
Heidegger has had a minimal impact on legal theory.68  
His influence has been limited to studies that have attempted 
to make connections between Continental hermeneutics and 
the Anglo-American legal tradition.69  It seems surprising that 
anxieties concerning the denigration of law into technology 
have not drawn upon Heidegger.  This absence is possibly 
explained by the on-going controversy regarding Heidegger’s 
involvement with the Nazis and the suggestion that his Nazi 
involvement can be grounded in his thought.70 This is 
 63. AGAMBEN, supra note 59, at 187. 
 64. DOUZINAS, supra note 42, at 322. 
 65. Derrida, supra note 55, at 46. 
 66. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 87–88 (2005). 
 67. COSTAS DOUZINAS & RONNIE WARRINGTON, JUSTICE MISCARRIED: 
ETHICS, AESTHETICS AND THE LAW (1994). 
 68. Panu Minkkinen, Right Things: On the Question of Being and Law, 7 
LAW & CRITIQUE 65, 66 (1996). 
 69. Ingrid Scheibler, Gadamer, Heidegger and the Social Dimensions of 
Language: Reflections on the Critical Potential of Hermeneutical Philosophy 
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 853, 856–69 (2000); Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the 
Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 253–54 (1996). 
 70. Matthias Mahlmann, Heidegger’s Political Philosophy and the Theory 
of the Liberal State, 14 LAW AND CRITIQUE 229, 240–244 (2003). 
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unfortunate.  Where legal theory presented a juridical-political 
account of law as technology, Heidegger exposes the 
ontological commitments that manifest within that account.  
In doing so, he opens fresh ways to think about law and 
technology. What follows is an exposition of Heidegger’s 
relationship between technology and his fundamental concern 
with the forgetting of Being in the West.  What is suggested is 
that this metaphysical account has been highly influential 
within technology studies and has lead to two styles of 
scholarship.  The first remains metaphysical and regards 
technology as polluting and degrading human existence.  The 
second, grounded on being-in the world opens to 
phenomenology. 
Heidegger’s writings on technology need to be considered 
from within his wider concerns with the impoverishment of 
ontology, and the need for a revitalized ontology to structure 
critical questions about modern existence.71  For Heidegger, 
the Western metaphysical tradition had forgotten the question 
of Being.72  That is, the ontological task of thinking about 
being an entity disclosed to its own existence73 had been 
passed over in favor of “pragmatic” abstractions.74  Technology 
was important to Heidegger, not because of its monstrous 
violence, but because in its holding sway the forgetting of 
Being is absolute.75  Therefore, Heidegger’s grappling with 
technology belongs within a project to find a “restorative 
surmounting of the essence of technology.”76  For Heidegger, 
technology does not just amount to machines, but is a 
fundamental way of revealing the world as is: 
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the 
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That 
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is 
unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is 
 71. ANDREW FEENBERG, HEIDEGGER AND MARCUSE: THE CATASTROPHE 
AND REDEMPTION OF  HISTORY 25 (2005). 
 72. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 1 (Joan Stambaugh trans., 
1996). 
 73. Id. at 10–11, 40–42. 
 74. MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN, HEIDEGGER’S CONFRONTATION WITH 
MODERNITY: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ART 152 (1990). 
 75. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 115, 116 (William Lovitt 
trans., 1977). 
 76. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Turning, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 36, 39 (William Lovitt trans., 1977). 
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stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is 
distributed is switched about ever anew.77 
This leads Heidegger to name the essence of technology 
Enframing:78 
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which 
sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to revel the real, in the 
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of 
revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and 
which is nothing technological.79 
This quote suggests three elements concerning the essence 
of technology.  The first is that technology “revel[s] the real:” 
that is it occupies the very essence of humanity.  For 
Heidegger, to be human means to be “thrown” into the world, 
and our fate is to come to a dwelling in this finite totality.”80  
Second, humans in their “thrown-ness” are gifted with the 
responsibility towards truth; “man is given to belong to the 
coming-to-pass of truth.”81  Heidegger’s use of truth is not to 
invoke correspondence,82 but a pre-Socratic notion of “truth” 
(alētheia) concerned with how the world is revealed.  The 
destiny of humanity is in bringing forth what is undisclosed.83  
Third, Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a way of 
revealing, allowed him to situate technology within Being.  
“Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to 
presence in the realm where revealing and un-concealment 
take place, where alētheia, truth, happens.”84 
Having located technology within Being, Heidegger sets 
out the ontological commitments of such a Being. Enframing 
involves “setting upon.”  Rather then letting beings reveal 
themselves to humanity, humanity imposes a technological 
“truth” onto entities.85  This truth is a “standing-reserve” in a 
stockpile, ready-at-hand to be deployed.86  The fate of the 
world is it becomes atomized, abstracted, and 
 77. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE 
QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 16 (William 
Lovitt trans., 1977). 
 78. Id. at 19. 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. HEIDEGGER, supra note 72, at 127–29. 
 81. HEIDEGGER, supra note 77, at 32. 
 82. HEIDEGGER, supra note 75, at 127. 
 83. HEIDEGGER, supra note 77, at 32. 
 84. Id. at 13. 
 85. Id. at 15–18. 
 86. Id at 14. 
TRANTER K. Nomology, Ontology, and Phenomenology of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 2007;8(2):449-474. 
464 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
                                                          
 
commensurable.87  There is a danger in this: 
As soon as the unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, 
but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the 
midst of the objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-
reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, 
he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as 
standing-reserve.88 
This loss in standing-reserve discloses an even greater 
danger.  “Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every 
other possibility of revealing, Above all, Enframing conceals 
that revealing which . . . lets what presences come forth into 
appearance.”89  The challenging-forth of Enframing blocks 
more original bringing-forth of things in-themselves.  The 
supreme danger then is that Enframing conceals the very 
possibility of revealing, removing humanity from alētheia.90 
In summary, technology for Heidegger was not just 
machines: it was a fundamental way to view the world, a way 
of seeing that reduces the world to a mere stockpile of 
resources waiting for human use.  This extends to the way of 
seeing humans themselves.  The ultimate danger, however, is 
that revealing the world is the fundamental task of Being.  
Technology in occupying this place within modern existence 
deprives us humans from seeing the ‘truth’ of the world.  
Technology, thus properly understood and located means that 
we live a polluted and corrupted form of existences that can 
not see beyond the ceaseless calculus of technology. 
There are two elements from Heidegger for thinking about 
law and technology.  The first exculpates law and technology 
scholarship’s reduction of law to technology.  Where “the 
coming to presence of technology . . . is Being itself,”91 an 
instrumental law is consistent with the foundation ontology of 
the “age.”92  Indeed, Heidegger expects nothing more from 
“research man.”93  In this light, the technology of law in law 
and technology is revealed, not as ironic, but as another sign of 
the victory of technology.  Developing this insight at the level 
of theory, Heidegger offers an ontological location for the 
 87. Id. at 19. 
 88. Id. at 26–27. 
 89. Id. at 27. 
 90. Id. at 28. 
 91. HEIDEGGER, supra note 76, at 38. 
 92. HEIDEGGER, supra note 75, at 115. 
 93. Id. at 125. 
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nomology of sovereignty identified previously.  Heidegger 
provides an explanation for the juridical-political account of 
the rise of sovereignty and positivism; both witness a 
challenging-forth of law into a malleable standing-reserve 
ready to be deployed.94  He also charts the bloody “precipitous 
fall” when orderer becomes ordered.  In this, Heidegger’s 
technology writings possibly allow for another approach to the 
maligned task of an ontology—or at least a regional 
ontology95—of law.96 
The second element is the delineation of the task of 
thinking about law and technology once the holding sway of 
technology is noted.  Heidegger’s account of technology has had 
a decisive influence on technology studies; Herbert Marcuse,97 
Jacques Ellul,98 and more recently Albert Borgmann99 and 
Francis Fukuyama100 have grounded their critiques of modern 
technology on metaphysical foundations.  There is a tragic 
aura surrounding this tradition.101  The absolute of technology, 
its occupation of Being, and the decline of more authentic 
Being,  means that it is difficult to theorize strategies for 
overcoming technology.102  Heidegger’s response is poetic.  
Indeed, there is a poetic resonance to his thought—truth as 
revealing, being as responsibility to revealing—that crescendos 
with his affirmation of the “saving power” of art.103  For 
Heidegger, meditation on the essence of technology does not 
 94. Nonet, supra note 62, at 686. 
 95. JARKKO TONTII, RIGHT AND PREJUDICE: PROLEGOMENA TO A 
HERMENEUTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82 (2004). 
 96. Minkkinen, supra note 68, at 84. 
 97. HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE 
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964); see also FEENBERG, 
supra note 71. 
 98. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson 
trans., 1964); see also ANDREW FEENBERG, QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY 3 
(1999). 
 99. ALBERT BORGMANN, HOLDING ON TO REALITY: THE NATURE OF 
INFORMATION AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM (1999); see also Peter-Paul 
Verbeek, Devices of Engagement: On Borgmann’s Philosophy of Information 
and Technology, 6 TECHNE 69 (2002). 
 100. FRANCIS FUKIYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE  BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); see also David E. Tabachnick, The 
Politics and Philosophy of Anti-Science, 9 TECHNE 27 (2005). 
 101. STEPHEN HILL, THE TRAGEDY OF TECHNOLOGY: HUMAN LIBERATION 
VERSUS DOMINATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1988); see also 
David E. Tabachnick, Techne, Technology, and Tragedy, 7 TECHNE 91 (2004). 
 102. Andrew Norris, Heideggerian Law Beyond Law?: Technique, Recht, 
and Phusis, 2 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 341, 344 (2006). 
 103. HEIDEGGER, supra note 72, at 32. 
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only show the dominance of technology in the West but 
reminds us of technology’s ancient sibling. Referring again to 
pre-Socratic Greece, he observed that once “there was a time 
when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was 
called technē.  And the poēisis of the fine arts also was called 
technē.”104 He suggested that “revealing lays claim to the arts 
most primally, so that they for their part may expressly foster 
the growth of the saving power, may awaken.”105  Heidegger’s 
affirmation of art as the place which has kept alive alternative 
modes of revealing is contested. Indeed, Benjamin suggested 
that in art the combination of art and technique is inseparable; 
art anticipates technology, and the technicality of art demarks 
“humanity’s entire mode of existence.”106  Benjamin can be 
seen as pointing towards an alternative direction from 
Heidegger: a turning away from metaphysics, and also a 
turning away from romantic attachments to an idealized past 
of authentic being. In technology studies, this post-
Heideggerian strand can be identified in Donna Haraway.107 
Haraway expressly rejected metaphysical approaches to 
thinking about technology.  Her appropriation of science 
fiction’s cyborg is without tragedy or romance.  The cyborg is a 
materialist account of what it means to be human at the 
particular moment when technology has undermined the past 
certainties of existence:108 “[t]he cyborg is our ontology.”109  In 
this, Haraway seems to reiterate Heidegger’s declaration of 
the occupation of Being by technology.  However, instead of 
talking of the saving power of art, Haraway affirms active 
engagement with the contemporary “informatics of 
domination.”110  The issue is staking a life, and politics, from 
“inside the belly of the monster” of modern technological 
existence.111  Rosi Braidotti, in recognizing the influences of 
 104. Id. at 34. 
 105. Id. at 35. 
 106. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217, 222 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968). 
 107. ROSI BRAIDOTTI, TRANSPOSITIONS: ON NOMADIC ETHICS 57 (2006). 
 108. DONNA HARAWAY, 
MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENIUM.FEMALEMAN©_MEETS_ONCOMOUS
E™: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE 51 (1997). 
 109. Donna J. Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and 
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REV. 65, 66 (1985). 
 110. Id. at 79. 
 111. Constance Penley & Andrew Ross, Cyborgs at Large: Interview with 
Donna Haraway, 25 SOC. TEXT 8, 12 (1990). 
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French post-structuralists Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze 
in Haraway’s cyborg, has argued for the “embodied, materialist 
foundations of the subject in a non-essentialist yet accountable 
manner.”112  In doing so she affirms that this approach takes 
as its orientation Heidegger’s recognition that the horizon of 
humanity rests in being thrown into the world, yet it avoids 
his romance with art and metaphysics.113  For Braidotti, 
being-in the world must ground development of “new 
cosmologies . . . that are appropriate to our own high level of 
technological development.”114  Braidotti’s talk of cosmologies 
suggests a revisiting of law and technology scholarship.  What 
is suggested here is a challenge to the double inscription of the 
Frankenstein myth within law and technology scholarship 
that was identified earlier.  Instead, of a monstrous technology 
needing a monstrous law, both technology and law are 
repositioned as thoroughly social, as being-in the world.  In 
this they present no-less danger to society or even human life, 
however, their dangerous becomes a known quantity and the 
complex relationships between law and technology are 
exposed. 
IV. PHENOMENOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY 
Haraway and Braidotti both approach the question of 
technology and humanity from the ground of being-in the 
world. In this they offer a phenomenology of technology.  Their 
concern is with charting the complex relations of culture, 
nature, knowledge, and power of the here-and-now, as the 
basis for political engagement and ethical conduct.  My 
argument is that the phenomenology of technology has the 
potential to enrich law and technology.  Two approaches for a 
phenomenology of law and technology are explored. The first 
follows Haraway and Latour and examines the relationships of 
law, technology and society from within a detailed historical 
frame.  The second draws upon science fiction to consider the 
cultural basis of the speculative jurisdiction of law and 
technology. 
The first draws upon Haraway’s desire that “[a]ny 
interesting being in technoscience, such as a textbook, 
molecule, equation . . . can – and often should – be teased open 
to show the sticky economic, technical, political, organic, 
 112. BRAIDOTTI, supra note 107, at 137. 
 113. Id. at 142. 
 114. Id. at 272. 
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historical, mythic and textual threads that make up its 
tissues.”115  Notwithstanding her disagreement with Latour,116 
this task seems analogous to Latour’s actor network theory.  
Latour’s early research considered how scientific facts do not 
arrive from the black box of the laboratory but emerges 
through a process of translation and alliances between 
scientists and other actors.  While Latour considers actors 
from within a scientist’s research community and political, 
media, and economic actors, his insight is that machines and 
objects also should be treated as actors within his sociology of 
networks.117  In Aramis or The Love of Technology, Latour 
traces how mundane and often haphazard political, economic, 
social, and technical factors, and the personalities of agents, 
including the personality of the technology itself, interacted 
over an eighteen year period, and led to the abandonment of 
an alternative public transport system for Paris.118 
This body of research suggests an approach to law and 
technology that undertakes detailed examinations of the 
networks at play behind not just technological change, but also 
legal responses to technological change.  Templates for this 
type of study can be found in the detailed historical studies on 
the relations between culture and technology, for example 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s complex study of railways in the 
nineteenth century.119  There has been some research that 
undertakes this type of historical analysis to law and 
technology.  Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently trace the 
multitude of factors that impacted the changes and emergence 
of British intellectual property law, noting the variations in 
alliances of representations, interests groups and general 
conceptions of good government during their extended time 
period (1760-1911).120  I have tried to show how an early 
Australian motor vehicle law can be understood, not as a 
simplistic reaction to the motor vehicle, but a complex 
 115. HARAWAY, supra note 108, at 68. 
 116. Id. at 34. 
 117. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS 
AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987). 
 118. BRUNO LATOUR, ARAMIS OR THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY (Catherine 
Porter trans., 1996). 
 119. WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE RAILWAY JOURNEY: THE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF TIME AND SPACE IN THE 19TH CENTURY (1986). 
 120. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760–1911 (1999). 
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interchange of public anxiety, the personality of specific 
politicians, use of English templates, lobbying by the nascent 
motoring club, and a manifestation of a public culture that 
celebrated technology as progress, dreamed of mass 
automotive transportation and regarded regulative legislation 
as the best, most modern form of governing.121 
This type of research maps the complexities of culture and 
personalities, and the more “abstract” political, economic, and 
legal contexts.  It shows how law and technology are not only 
joined at the site of law regulating a technology, but also have 
multiple intersections. It can also contribute to technology 
studies.  Notwithstanding Latour’s passing reference to law as 
a “modest technology,”122 law has not been considered within 
existing research.  Indeed, when Latour writes about the red 
light flashing in his motor vehicle insisting that he fasten his 
seat belt,123 it is a machine animated by ninety years of legal 
argument concerning who carries the liability for motor vehicle 
safety, the state, the manufacturer or the driver. Also, this 
form of scholarship, in building an archive of how actual laws, 
or even actual non-laws (movements towards law that were 
scuttled), can provide a basis for law and technology scholars 
to contribute to the task of advising about law and technology.  
Instead of passing responsibility to another black box—the 
political will—as Reynolds does, a more sophisticated 
generalization can be developed on how law and technology 
interact. 
An alternative to this historical direction of a 
phenomenology of law and technology is to look at the 
everyday goings on of law and technology.  This can be seen to 
follow the anthropological work of Marilyn Strathern who 
undertook an ethnographic study of in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
 121. Kieran Tranter, The History of the Haste-Wagons’: The Motor Car Act 
1909 (VIC), Emergent Technology and the Call for Law, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 
843 (2005). 
 122. LATOUR, supra note 118, at 45. Latour has recently written about the 
courtroom from his perspective of the production of “facts” in a laboratory. 
However, the traces of law on technology have not been thoroughly pursued. 
See Bruno Latour, Scientific Objects and Legal Objectivity, in LAW, 
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS 
AND THINGS 73 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2004). 
 123. Bruno Latour, Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few 
Mundane Artifacts, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY / BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES 
IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 225, 226 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 
1992). 
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technologies to identify Western notions of kinship.124  Her 
research is reminiscent of Shoshana Zuboff’s description of 
double security doors at a mill that were phased so that only 
one could be open at any time: which broke because staff 
consistently pushed their way through.125  At the level of 
being-in the world in the daily life of the contemporary West 
rarely does technology impose itself as Heidegger’s Enframing, 
and rarely does law impose itself as abstract rules. Technology 
and law are part of the background of the activities of daily 
life, something Langdon Winner reminds about technology.126  
Mundane tasks such as driving a motor vehicle down a street 
involve a kaleidoscope of legal and technical considerations 
and interrelations.  A human driving invokes legal regimes of 
licensing, criminal laws relating to motor vehicles, of torts and 
insurance law (concerning liability) and of contract, consumer 
protection and property (concerning ownership) and reliance 
on the multiple technical apparatus of the motor vehicle, 
which in-turn are influenced by laws relating to, for example 
safety and fuel consumption.  Given these complexities of 
human, law and technology no wonder human car relations 
have been argued to be cybernetic.127  However, in the task of 
driving, the driver remains ignorant of these and their 
multiple interactions.  Drawing upon Latour’s later work it can 
be said that technological objects and humans jointly form a 
culture which structures particular forms of relationships 
(between objects and objects, objects and humans, humans and 
humans) and within which some relationships possess 
particular characteristics that allow them to be regarded as 
profane, ethical, or legal.128  In this manifestation, a 
phenomenology of law and technology examines the contours 
of contemporary culture locating the relations of law and 
technology in the realm of practice.  Implicit in this approach 
is the realization that in the messy complexities of everyday 
 124. MARILYN STRATHERN, AFTER NATURE: ENGLISH KINSHIP IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992). 
 125. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE 
FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 21 (1988). 
 126. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR 
LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 7–9 (1986). 
 127. Kieran Tranter, Mad Max: The Car and Australian Government, 5 
NATIONAL IDENTITIES 61 (2003). 
 128. Bruno Latour, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOC’Y 247 (2002). 
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life in the West there is a more sophisticated “theorizing” of 
technology than the post-Heidegger metaphysical strand 
within technology studies recognizes.129  Notwithstanding, as 
was identified earlier, this tradition’s tendency to announce 
technology as holding sway over Being and, therefore, the 
difficulties, if not the inescapable tragedy of technology for the 
West, contemporary culture seems to provide sufficient 
resources for many Westerners to live within a highly 
technological society and to adapt to technological changes.130 
Within technology studies, this respect for contemporary 
culture is recognized in the links it forges with science fiction 
studies.  Haraway’s adoption of the cyborg is a key moment in 
the cross-fertilization of these two disciplines.131  In law, the 
field of law and literature is increasingly moving away from its 
canonical texts and orthodox concerns with courtrooms and 
images of lawyers132 through analyzing the “culture of 
legality” recorded in popular texts.133  An emerging element of 
this movement has been the discovery of science fiction by 
legal scholars,134 and a realization that science fiction 
contributes to popular jurisprudence.135  What remains to be 
explored is science fiction as a discourse on the theory of law 
and technolo
As identified in the circulation of the Frankenstein myth 
 129. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF 
LATE CAPITALISM 376 (1991). 
 130. As recently suggested by Turkle in recognition of the adoption of 
computers.  Sherry Turkle, Our Split Screens, in COMMUNITY IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 101 (Andrew Feenberg & Darin Barney eds., 2004). 
 131. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., The Cyborg and the Kitchen Sink; or The 
Salvation Story of No Salvation Story, 25 SCI.-FICTION STUD. 510 (1998). 
 132. Austin Sarat et al., On Film and Law: Broadening the Focus, in LAW 
ON THE SCREEN 1 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,  2005). 
 133. WILLIAM P. MACNEIL, LEX POPULI: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF POPULAR 
CULTURE (2007). 
 134. See, e.g., Christine Corcos, Isabel Corcos & Brian Stockhoff, Double-
Take: A Second Look at Cloning, Science Fiction and Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 
1041 (1999); Christine Corcos, “I Am Not a Number I Am a Free Man!”: 
Physical and Psychological Imprisonment in Science Fiction, 25 LEGAL STUD. 
F. 472 (2001); Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the Federation: 
Images of Law, Lawyers and the Legal System in “Star Trek: The Next 
Generation”, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1992); Jeffery Nesteruk, A New Narrative 
for Corporate Law, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 281 (1999); Richard J. Peltz, On a 
Wagon Train to Afghanistan: Limitations on Star Trek’s Prime Directive, 25 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 635 (2003); William Pencak, Lyres Against the 
Law: Orpheus as Cyberpunk Outlaw, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 293 (1999). 
 135. William P. MacNeil, PreCrime Never Pays! ‘Law and Economics’ in 
Minority Report, 19 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 201 (2005). 
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within law and technology scholarship, metaphors with 
fictitious origins structure legal accounts of technology.  
Further, law and technology scholarship, as was shown in 
Reynolds, gestures towards the future when it imagines the 
impacts of the specific technology under the legal 
microscope.136  This is a fundamental element of law and 
technology writing.  There is a claim about “what if” 
technology develops in a certain way, and then evidence that 
such speculations are not groundless.  In this law and 
technology claims for itself a speculative jurisdiction; that is it 
makes what seems at the time reasonable and justifiable 
claims about the future.  History can later judge on the 
oracular quality of past exercises of the speculative 
jurisdiction.137  It is science fiction that is a privileged resource 
in this future projecting by law of the consequences of 
technological change.  For example I have argued elsewhere 
that the form and content of international space law of the 
1960s and 1970s responded to imaginations and anxieties of 
technological future present in 1950s “Golden Age” science 
fiction such as Isaac Asimov and Fredrick Pohl and C. M. 
Kornbluth.138 The opportunity for law and technology is that it 
could make this process explicit. Further, through 
systematically approaching science fiction as material through 
which being-in the world with technology can be glimpsed, not 
only would law and technology be reflecting on its own 
discursive practices, but might be able to challenge and 
substitute its foundational Frankenstein myth with a wider 
repertoire of metaphors and narratives through which to think 
about law and technology.139 
 136. See, e.g., Barry Brown, Human Cloning and Genetic Engineering: The 
Case for Proceeding Cautiously, 65 ALB. L. REV. 649, 649–650 (2002); Lyria 
Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The 
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 509 (2005). 
 137. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Law’s Empire and the Final Frontier: 
Legalizing the Future in the Earlyorpus Juris Spatialis, 108 YALE L. J. 1737 
(1999). Beebe examines the exercise of the specular jurisdiction by 
international space lawyers during the “golden age” of space law. 
 138. Kieran Tranter Terror in the Texts: Law – Technology – Future  13 
LAW & CRITIQUE 75 (2002) 
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CONCLUSION 
Thinking about the theory of law and technology yields a 
series of recognitions.  There is recognition that much law and 
technology scholarship is structured by a particular 
manifestation of the Frankenstein myth that ironically casts 
law as technology.  In this it is possible to say that law and 
technology already present a theoretical account of law and 
technology. In regarding law as technology, what is disclosed is 
the nomology of sovereignty, which legal theory has charted as 
involving law as malleable rules emanating from a sovereign 
that, in the extreme moment, can violently reduce humans to 
animals to be used and sacrificed at will.  In technology 
studies, this juridical-political account is placed within the 
ontological realm through Heidegger’s argument that modern 
Being has been given over to a mode of disclosing that involves 
the ordering of the world as standing reserve.  It was 
suggested that there are two post-Heideggerian strands with 
technology studies. The first, tracking Heidegger closely, is the 
metaphysical account of technology. This leads to glum 
destinations of absolute technology and enslaved humanity. 
The second lies in appreciation of being-in the world, or a 
Haraway and Braidotti inspired phenomenology of technology.  
Two directions were offered for the phenomenology of law and 
technology.  The first, drawing upon Latour, was a historical 
project of mapping the complexities of law and technology 
through detailed study of the networks that manifest in 
particular technologies and particular moments of lawmaking.  
The second was to appreciate the sophistication of 
contemporary culture in allowing a highly dynamic 
technological life through recognition of the current 
significance of science fiction to law and technology’s 
speculative jurisdiction and to analysis science fiction, not only 
rendering this process transparent, but as a way of 
supplanting the foundational Frankenstein myth with 
additional metaphors and narratives. 
In conclusion, this Article argues for a diverse law and 
technology scholarship. In particular, it suggests that 
contemporary law and technology scholarship grounded on the 
Frankenstein myth of reducing law to technology, fails to 
capture the diversity and complexities of law’s and 
technology’s interactions. Through considering law as 
technology from the perspective of legal theory and technology 
studies it was argued that a hybrid approach, drawing upon 
insights from both disciplines, suggests that phenomenological 
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studies, that is a focus on being-in the world, offers a way 
forward for the law and technology. To this end detailed 
historical analysis of networks or the systemic analysis of 
science fiction was presented as alternative methods through 
which to study law and technology. 
